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Abstract-The society has grown to rely on internet services, and 
the number of internet client increases every day. As more 
users are connected to the network, millions a user to do their 
damage becomes very great and lucrative. In conventional 
firewall rely on topology restrictions and controlled network 
entry points to enforce packet filtering. In this paper, I propose 
method of multiple firewall concepts and maintain the 
database for both the authorized and unauthorized entry 
details based on security policy to enforce the static and 
dynamic packet filtering. This technique is implemented in 
software tool called distributed firewall policy advisor and 
specialized database (SDB).  
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I. INTRODUCTION FIREWALL 
he firewall is a computer hardware or software that 
limits access to a computer over a network or from an 
outside source. The firewall is used to create security check 
points at the boundaries of private network. 
A firewall is placed at an entry point where a private 
computer network is connected to the outside Internet. It 
intercepts all the packets that are exchanged between the 
private computer network and the rest of the Internet and 
examines the IP, TCP and UDP headers of each intercepted 
packet and decides whether to accept the packet or to 
discard the packet network of a large enterprise has tens or 
even hundreds of firewalls. These firewalls are placed at the 
entry points of the private In the case of companies, if 
when ordinary firewall is used everyone were given 
the same class policy. By the implementation of the 
distributed firewall, multiple firewall concepts each 
and every one with in the organization was provided 
with separate access policy, separate authentication. 
A. General Techniques 
General techniques that firewall use to control access and 
enforce the site‘s security policy. 
Service control 
 It determines the types of internet service that can be 
accessed inbound (or) outbound.  
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Direction control 
It determines the direction in which particular service 
request may be indicate and allowed to flow through the 
firewall. 
User control 
Control access to service according to which user is 
attempting to access it. 
Behavioral control 
 Controls now particular services are used. 
B. Firewall diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. THE DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL 
A distributed firewall uses a central policy, but pushes 
enforcement towards the edges. That is, the policy defines 
what connectivity, inbound and outbound, is permitted; this 
policy is distributed to all endpoints, which enforce it. In the 
full-blown version, endpoints are characterized by their 
IPsec identity, typically in the form of a certificate. Rather 
than relying on the topological notions of ―inside‖ and 
―outside‖, as is done by a traditional firewall, a distributed 
firewall assigns certain rights to whichever machines own 
the private keys corresponding to certain public keys. [1][2] 
To implement a distributed firewall for allowing and storing 
authorized and unauthorized specialized database, we need a 
T 
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strong verification and validation security policy language 
that can describe which connections are acceptable. 
Basic Working of Distributed Firewalls 
Distributed firewalls are the following   three components.     
1. A language for expressing policies and resolving 
requests. In their simplest form, policies in a 
distributed firewall are functionally equivalent to 
packet filtering rules. However, it is desirable to 
use an extensible system (so other types of 
applications and security checks can be specified 
and enforced in the future). The language and 
resolution mechanism should also support 
credentials, for delegation of rights and 
authentication purposes [4]. 
2. A mechanism for safely distributing security 
policies. This may be the IPsec key management 
protocol when possible, or some other protocol. 
The integrity of the policies transferred must be 
guaranteed, either through the communication 
protocol or as part of the policy object description 
(e.g., they may be digitally signed). 
3. A mechanism that applies the security policy to 
incoming packets or connections, providing the 
enforcement part.Distributed firewalls rest on three 
notions: 
 A policy language that states what sort of 
connections are permitted or prohibited.[3] 
 Any of a number of system management tools, 
such as Microsoft's SMS or ASD, and 
 IPSEC, the network-level encryption mechanism 
for TCP/IP.  
Components of a distributed firewall 
 A central management system for designing the 
policies.  
 Policy Distribution.  
 Host end Implementation.  
Central management system 
Central Management, a component of distributed firewalls, 
makes it practical to secure enterprise-wide servers, 
desktops, laptops, and workstations. Central management 
provides greater control and efficiency and it decreases the 
maintenance costs of managing global security installations. 
This feature addresses the need to maximize network 
security resources by enabling policies to be centrally 
configured, deployed, monitored, and updated. From a 
single workstation, distributed firewalls can be scanned to 
understand the current operating policy and to determine if 
updating is required 
Policy distribution 
The policy distribution scheme should guarantee the 
integrity of the policy during transfer. The distribution of the 
policy can be different and varies with the implementation. 
It can be either directly pushed to end systems, or pulled 
when necessary. [3] 
Host-end implementation 
The security policies transmitted from the central 
management server have to be implemented by the host. The 
host end part of the Distributed Firewall does provide any 
administrative control for the network administrator to 
control the implementation of policies. The host allows 
traffic based on the security rules it has implemented. 
Policy Language 
Policy is enforced by each individual host that participates 
in a distributed firewall. The distributed firewall 
administrator--who is no longer necessarily the "local" 
administrator, since we are no longer constrained by by 
topology--defines the security policy in terms of host 
identifiers. The resulting policy (probably, though not 
necessarily, compiled to some convenient internal format) is 
then shipped out, much like any other change. This policy 
file is consulted before processing incoming or outgoing 
messages, to verify their compliance. It is most natural to 
think of this happening at the network or transport layers, 
but policies and enforcement can equally well apply to the 
application layer.  
Policy verification 
Policy verification is enforced by the each incoming packet 
as per the user specified policy and also verifies the 
inconsistencies. 
Policy validation 
A policy validation method normally validating firewall 
security policy in a  heterogeneous network with a complex 
layout.The policy validation system is concerned; there are 
two distinct kinds of failure.[13] 
Host FailureAny of the network hosts can fail at any time. 
Generally, a host failure may be difficult to distinguish from 
a network failure, from the perspective of the rest of the 
network. Recovery, however, is somewhat different. The 
things that a node needs to keep track of—subordinates, 
ongoing tests, previous test results, commands, the node ID, 
and so forth—do not change very quickly, and it is 
possibleto store all of that information on disk.. [13] 
Network FailureThe network can obviously fail at any time, 
or can simply not be laid out as expected. From this 
perspective, any command that gets lost can be viewed as an 
unexpected, failed network test. These can be ignored or 
reported to the root Manager in some way, as they indicate a 
network status that to the distributed firewall administrator. 
[13] 
Distributed firewall policy Advisor (DFPA) 
 In DFPA techniques are simplifies the management of 
filtering rules and also maintain the strong security of 
firewalls. 
The filtering rules and policy rules are implemented using 
java programming language in a software tool called DFPA. 
[6][7] 
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Specialized Database (SDB) 
Database is nothing but collection of interrelated data and a 
set of programs to access those data. The collection of data 
usually referred to as Database (DB). 
The current research propose the specialized database for 
allowing and storing of authorized and unauthorized 
database user according to policy verification and validation 
scheme. 
III. THREAT COMPARISON 
Distributed firewalls have both strengths and weaknesses 
when compared to conventional firewalls. By far the biggest 
difference is their reliance on topology. If your topology 
does not permit reliance on traditional firewall techniques. 
[5] 
A. Service Exposure and Port Scanning 
Both types of firewalls are excellent at rejecting connection 
requests for inappropriate services. Conventional firewalls 
drop the requests at the border; distributed firewalls do so at 
the host. A more interesting question is what is noticed by 
the host attempting to connect. Today, such packets are 
typically discarded, with no notification. A distributed 
firewall may choose to discard the packet, under the 
assumption that its legal peers know to use IPSEC; 
alternatively, it may instead send back a response requesting 
that the connection be authenticated, which in turn gives 
notice of the existence of the host.  
Firewalls built on pure packet filters cannot reject some 
"stealth scans" very well. One technique, for example, uses 
fragmented packets that can pass through unexamined 
because the port numbers aren't present in the first fragment. 
A distributed firewall will reassemble the packet and then 
reject it.  
B. Application-level Proxies 
Some services require an application-level proxy. 
Conventional firewalls often have an edge here; the filtering 
code is complex and not generally available on host 
platforms. As noted, a hybrid technique can often be used to 
overcome this disadvantage.  
In some cases, of course, application-level controls can 
avoid the problem entirely. If the security administrator can 
configure all Web browsers to reject ActiveX, there is no 
need to filter incoming HTML via a proxy.  
In other cases, a suitably sophisticated IPSEC 
implementation will suffice. For example, there may be no 
need to use a proxy that scans outbound FTP control 
messages for PORT commands, if the kernel will permit an 
application that has opened an outbound connection to 
receive inbound connections. This is more or less what such 
a proxy would do.  
C. Intrusion Detection 
Many firewalls detect attempted intrusions. If that 
functionality is to be provided by a distributed firewall, each 
individual host has to notice probes and forward them to 
some central location for processing and correlation.  
The former problem is not hard; many hosts already log 
such attempts. One can make a good case that such detection 
should be done in any event. Collection is more problematic, 
especially at times of poor connectivity to the central site. 
There is also the risk of co-ordinated attacks in effect 
causing a denial of service attack against the central 
machine.  
D. Insider Attacks 
At first glance, the biggest weakness of distributed firewalls 
is their greater susceptibility to lack of cooperation by users. 
Although there are technical measures that can be taken, as 
discussed earlier, these are limited in their ability to cope 
with serious misbehavior. That said, we assert that this 
problem is not a real differentiator.  Even conventional 
firewalls are easily subverted by an uncooperative insider. In 
other words, an insider who wishes to violate firewall 
policy, the firewall administrator filter that packet. 
On the other hand, distributed firewalls can reduce the threat 
of actual attacks by insiders, simply by making it easier to 
set up smaller groups of users. Thus, one can restrict access 
to a file server to only those users who need it, rather than 
letting anyone inside the company pound on it. 
IV. IMPLEMENTAION TECHNIQUES 
A. Use case diagram 
A use case is an interaction between users and a system; it 
captures the goal of the users and the responsibility of the 
system to its users. The current research in our 
implementation techniques diagrammatic representation as 
follows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  It is an initiative way of describing the behavior of a 
system by viewing the interaction between the system and 
its environment. 
List of actors in the distributed firewall 
 Add policy 
 Remove policy 
 Apply policy 
 Connect 
 Disconnect 
 Change password 
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 Misuse 
 Check packets 
 
Add policy 
The distributed firewall administrator adds the policy to the 
firewall, which is stored in the temporary file. 
Remove policy 
The distributed firewall administrator removes the policy 
from the firewall, which is stored in the temporary file. 
Apply policy 
The distributed Firewall administrator updates the policy of 
the firewall from the temporary file.  
Connect 
Distributedfirewall administrator to connect the system. 
Successful case 
Distributedfirewall administrator makes a request control 
from the firewall, the control is granted. 
Failure case 
Firewall administrator makes a request to the firewall, as 
there is no firewall request gets timeout. 
Disconnect 
Distributedfirewall administrator change to the new 
password by giving the old password and the new password. 
Misuse 
Firewall gives the blocked details to the firewall 
administrator which is stored in the misuse file and that can 
be viewed by the firewall administrator. 
Check packet 
Firewall checks the packets as per theuser the policy. 
V.  RELATED WORK 
Current research on distributed firewall for authorized and 
unauthorized database user according to the policy 
verification and validation mainly focus the following. 
1) Maintaining the database for both authorized and 
unauthorized (ie.collecting the information from 
distributed firewall administrator). 
2) Verifying and validating the security policy in the 
networks. 
3) The testing and validating firewalls regularly. 
4) Identify the Static and dynamic vulnerability 
analysis.   
5) Strong Authentication and Authorization for each 
firewalls. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The main objective of this research is to implement a 
authorized and unauthorized  database user according to the 
policy verification and validation of  distributed firewall 
under the specialized database(SDB).In distributed firewall 
environment in order to keep track of some certain actions 
in the first stage (Create, Read, Update, Delete) that are 
performed on the policy rule set.  Then distributed firewall 
concept is explained and the comparison of two firewall 
designs is presented in terms of their performance in 
network security. The next stage is to give the details of 
distributed firewall environment for which the proposed the 
maintain specialized database is designed.  Such an 
application will be very helpful in network security 
management in protecting the consistency among the overall 
security policy. The data provided by the application can be 
used to implement more advanced tools like distributed 
firewall policy advisor tools(DFPA). 
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